We consider general allocation problems with indivisibilities where agents' preferences possibly exhibit externalities. In such contexts many different core notions were proposed. One is the γ-core whereby blocking is only allowed via allocations where the non-blocking agents receive their endowment. We show that if there exists an allocation rule satisfying individual rationality, efficiency, and strategy-proofness, then for any problem for which the γ-core is non-empty, the allocation rule must choose a γ-core allocation and all agents are indifferent between all allocations in the γ-core. We apply our result to housing markets, coalition formation and networks.
ties: (i) individual rationality: for any profile each agent weakly prefers the chosen allocation to his endowment; (ii) efficiency: no other feasible allocation Pareto dominates the chosen allocation; (iii) strategy-proofness: reporting the truth is a weakly dominant strategy.
Individual Rationality: For all R ∈ R and all i ∈ N , ϕ(R)R i w.
Efficiency: For all R ∈ R, there exists no a ∈ A f such that aR i ϕ(R) for all i ∈ N and aP j ϕ(R) for some j ∈ N .
Strategy-Proofness: For all R ∈ R, all i ∈ N , and all R i ∈ R i , ϕ(R)R i ϕ(R i , R −i ).
The principal result of Sönmez (1999) relates the existence of rules satisfying the above three properties with essentially single-valued cores.
Theorem 1 (Sönmez, 1999) If there exists an allocation rule ϕ : R → A f that is individually rational, efficient, and strategy-proof, then N , w, A f , R are such that 1. For all R ∈ R, for all a, b ∈ C(R), we have aI i b for all i ∈ N ;
2. For all R ∈ R with C(R) = ∅, we have ϕ(R) ∈ C(R).
Sönmez (1999) also established a converse result. For this the core needs to be externally stable: for any R and any b ∈ A f \C(R), there exists a ∈ C(R) and ∅ = T ⊆ N such that a wdom T b.
Weak Coalitional Strategy-Proofness: For all R ∈ R, all T ⊆ N , and all R T ∈ R T , there exists i ∈ T with ϕ(R)R i ϕ(R T , R −T ).
Proposition 1 (Sönmez, 1999) Let N , w, A f , R be such that the core correspondence is essentially single-valued and the core of each problem is externally stable.
Then any selection from the core correspondence is weakly coalitionally strategy-proof.
The γ-Core
Many papers have shown if-and-only-if versions of the result by Sönmez (1999) in environments where agents are selfish and have strict preferences over their own assignments, and allocations are "separable". However, his result allows for externalities in the sense that an agent might not be indifferent between two allocations where he receives the same set of objects.
Once externalities enter the environment, there are different notions of the core.
In particular, in the above dominance relation, a dominates b via some coalition T under R even if a is not individually rational for the agents outside of T and/or a(T ) w(T ) meaning that some of the undesired endowments of coalition T are consumed by non-blocking agents under a. Under externalities, the core may be frequently empty and Theorem 1 does not apply. This is the optimistic notion of the core.
Our notion below will only allow blocking for coalitions with some allocation where all other agents receive their endowment. This corresponds to Hart and Kurz (1983)'s and Chander and Tulken (1997)'s γ-stability of agreements whereby an agreement (or allocation) is disbanded once a coalition deviates and the others stay put with their endowment. In the γ-core blocking is only allowed with allocations where the nonblocking agents receive their endowments. For any R ∈ R, let
∃T and a ∈ A f with a wdom T b and a(i) = w(i) for all i ∈ N \T }.
Obviously, C(R) ⊆ C γ (R) for any profile R. Assumption A guarantees that for the γ-core blocking only occurs via allocations which are individually rational for the non-blocking agents. In addition, the blocking coalition needs to consume all of their endowments, i.e. a(T ) = w(T ).
Let IR(R) denote the set of feasible allocations which are individually rational under R.
Theorem 2 If there exists an allocation rule ϕ : R → A f that is individually rational, efficient, and strategy-proof, then N , w, A f , R are such that
2. For all R ∈ R with C γ (R) = ∅, we have ϕ(R) ∈ C γ (R).
If 1. or 2. does not hold, then there exists a ∈ C γ (R) such that not aI i ϕ(R) for all i ∈ N . 4 Because both a and ϕ(R) are efficient, there exists i ∈ N with aP i ϕ(R). By individual rationality, ϕ(R)R i w. We distinguish two cases: Now observe that Assumption A and ϕ(R)P i w imply ϕ(R)(i) = w(i). Also aP i ϕ(R)
implies aP i ϕ(R) and aR i wR i ϕ(R). Thus, by Assumption A and ϕ(R)(i) = w(i), we
By strategy-proofness, ϕ(R)R i ϕ(R i , R −i ). Hence, aP i ϕ(R i , R −i ). Now by 3.,
. Now this together with individual rationality and Assumption A implies ϕ(R i , R −i )(i) = w(i). Note that a ∈ C γ (R i , R −i ) and again 1. or 2. does not hold for (R i , R −i ), and
then by aP i ϕ(R), a Pareto dominates ϕ(R), a contradiction to efficiency of ϕ. Thus, there exists j ∈ N \{i} with aP j ϕ(R). If ϕ(R)(j) = w(j), then by Assumption A, ϕ(R)P j w, and we do the same as above. Otherwise, ϕ(R)(j) = w(j) and again we cannot have that ϕ(R) weakly dominates a via N \{i, j} (noting that ϕ(R)(i) = w(i) and ϕ(R)(j) = w(j)). If ϕ(R)I h a for all h ∈ N \{i, j}, then by aP i ϕ(R) and ϕ(R)(j) = w(j), a Pareto dominates ϕ(R), a contradiction to efficiency of ϕ. Note that we cannot have ϕ(R) = w because otherwise a Pareto dominates w and ϕ is not efficient. Because N is finite, we eventually find l with aP l ϕ(R) and ϕ(R)(l) = w(l).
Then we do the same construction as above.
Because N and A f are finite and the number of individually rational allocations becomes smaller at each step, this is a contradiction.
Since C(R) ⊆ C γ (R) for any profile R, C(R) = ∅ implies C γ (R) = ∅ and Theorem 1 follows from Theorem 2. Therefore, for any environment for which Theorem 1 is conclusive (i.e. for any profile R with C(R) = ∅), Theorem 2 is conclusive as well (i.e. C γ (R) = ∅ and both 1. and 2. must hold for the γ-core and the allocation rule ϕ (and therefore, 1. and 2. must hold for the core and the allocation rule ϕ)). Of course, for any profile R where C(R) = ∅ and C γ (R) = ∅, Theorem 1 has no bite whereas 1. and 2. of Theorem 2 must hold.
Using the proof of Proposition 1, we obtain the following conditional converse of Theorem 2.
Proposition 2 Let N , w, A f , R be such that the γ-core correspondence is essentially single-valued and the γ-core of each problem is externally stable. Then any selection from the γ-core correspondence is weakly coalitionally strategy-proof.
In the following we will argue that the γ-core is the "largest core notion" for which 1. and 2. of Theorem 2 hold in a preference domain free sense.
Given allocation a, we say that coalition T is effective for a if (i) a(i) ⊆ w(T ) for all i ∈ T and (ii) if |T | ≥ 2, then a(i) = w(i) for all i ∈ T . Note that for any profile R, all a, b ∈ A f and all S ⊆ N , if a weakly dominates b via S, then there exists T ⊆ S which is effective for a and a weakly dominates b via T . For a coalition to block individually rational allocations, we only need to consider allocations which are effective for this coalition.
Fixing N , w, and A f , we define for each coalition a set of feasible allocations via which this coalition can weakly dominate other allocations and for which this coalition is effective: formally, let
(B(T )) T ⊆N . Now B records for each coalition T the set of feasible allocations via which T can weakly dominate other allocations and for which T is effective. The B-core is defined as follows: for all R ∈ R, let C B (R) = {b ∈ A f : ∃T and a ∈ B(T ) with a wdom T b}.
The B f -core coincides with the core. Setting B γ (T ) = {a ∈ B f (T ) : a(i) = w(i) for all i ∈ N \T } and B γ = (B γ (T )) T ⊆N , the B γ -core coincides with the γ-core.
Obviously, for any B such that for all
have for any domain R and any profile R ∈ R, C(R) ⊆ C B (R) ⊆ C γ (R). Then by Theorem 2, both 1. and 2. of Theorem 2 must hold for the B-core for any profile
We call a domain R solvable if there exists an allocation rule ϕ : R → A f that is individually rational, efficient, and strategy-proof. Of course, if a domain is not solvable, then Theorem 2 holds for all B-cores and no comparison with the γ-core is possible. Indeed, we show that 1. and 2. of Theorem 2 hold for the B-core for any solvable preference domain if and only if the B-core is contained in the γ-core.
Let PO(R) denote the set of feasible allocations which are efficient under R.
Theorem 3 Fix (N, w, A f ) and B ⊆ B f . Then the following are equivalent:
(i) For any solvable domain R and any allocation rule ϕ : R → A f that is individually rational, efficient, and strategy-proof, N , w, A f , R are such that
2. For all R ∈ R with C B (R) = ∅, we have ϕ(R) ∈ C B (R).
(ii) For any solvable domain R,
and 2. hold for the B-core, i.e. (i) holds.
In showing the other direction, let R be a solvable domain. Let ϕ : R → A f be an allocation rule that is individually rational, efficient, and strategy-proof.
Suppose that 1. and 2. hold for the B-core but for some R ∈ R, C B (R) ⊆ C γ (R).
Then C B (R) = ∅ and 1. and 2. hold for C B (R), i.e. ϕ(R) ∈ C B (R).
Thus, by 1. for the B-core and 1. of Theorem 2, for all a ∈ C B (R) and all b ∈ C γ (R),
Hence, C γ (R) = ∅. By Assumption A and individual rationality of ϕ, for all
and by efficiency of ϕ, w ∈ C γ (R), a contradiction. Thus, S = ∅. LetR ∈ R be such that (i) for all i ∈ N \S,R i = R i and (ii) for all i ∈ S,
Note that Assumption B guarantees the existence ofR. It is straightforward that ϕ(R) ∈ C B (R). Thus, by 1. and 2. for the B-core, ϕ(R) ∈ C B (R) and for all i ∈ N , ϕ(R)Ĩ i ϕ(R). Since ϕ(R) / ∈ C γ (R), we have for someã ∈ A f and T ⊆ N ,
By Assumption A,ã ∈ IR(R). Now by construction ofR,ã wdom T ϕ(R) underR.
If C γ (R) = ∅, then by 2. of Theorem 2, ϕ(R) ∈ C γ (R). Now by ϕ(R)Ĩ i ϕ(R) for all i ∈ N , we then also have ϕ(R) ∈ C γ (R), a contradiction. Thus, C γ (R) = ∅.
Note thatã wdom T ϕ(R) underR,ã wdom T ϕ(R) underR, andã ∈ IR(R).
Without loss of generality,ã ∈ (IR∩PO)(R): if not, then for some c ∈ (IR∩PO)(R), c wdom Nã . Let W = {i ∈ N : c(i) = w(i)}. Then c wdom Wã underR and by construction, cR i ϕ(R) for all i ∈ W . Thus, c wdom W ϕ(R) underR.
For all i ∈ N , letR i be such that
Note that here it is not possible to define a "one-profile" domain (à la Takamiya (2003)) wherebỹ a and w are the only individually rational allocations because for some U T we may haveã ∈ B(U ) andã weakly dominates w via U (and one could let the rule chooseã for this profile without violating (i)).
individual rationality ofφ and Assumption A, d(i) = w(i). Thus, by construction,
If d =ã, then by construction ofR, we must haveã ∈ (IR ∩ PO)(R). By definition, thenφ(R) =ã, which is a contradiction.
If d = ϕ(R), then by construction we must haveφ(R) ∈ {w,ã}. Ifφ(R) = w, then dP i w and for all j ∈ N , ϕ(R)R j w, which is a contradiction to efficiency of ϕ. Ifφ(R) =ã andã(i) = w(i), then by construction ofR i ,ãR i d, which is a contradiction. Ifφ(R) =ã andã(i) = w(i), thenã ∈ (IR ∩ PO)(R i , R −i ) and by definition,φ(R i , R −i ) =ã, a contradiction.
Remark 1 If (i)
A f is separable in the following sense: for all a, b ∈ A f and all 
Applications

Global Trades
One application are global trades where either all agents receive their endowments or no agent receives his endowments. Let
Now note that if A f ⊆ A g ∪ {w}, then C γ coincides with the set of individually rational and efficient allocations.
We obtain the following corollary from our main result.
There exists an allocation rule ϕ : R → A f that is individually rational, efficient, and strategy-proof if and only if N , w, A f , R are such that 1. For all R ∈ R, for all a, b ∈ (IR ∩ PO)(R), we have aI i b for all i ∈ N ; 2. For all R ∈ R, we have ϕ(R) ∈ (IR ∩ PO)(R).
Proof. (Only if)
This follows directly from C γ = IR ∩ PO and Theorem 2.
(If) It is easy to see that for any R, (IR ∩ PO)(R) is externally stable and Proposition 2 yields the desired conclusion.
Note that Corollary 1 does not follow from Theorem 1 because C = IR ∩ PO.
Furthermore, C may often be empty (because coalitions T N may block with allocations a ∈ A f for which a(T ) = T ) and Theorem 1 often does not apply whereas above C γ is always non-empty. Note that R satisfies Assumptions A and B and that (IR ∩ PO)(R) = {(1, 2, 4, 3)} = C γ (R) and C(R) = ∅. Even though there is a unique individually rational and efficient allocation the core fails to identify it because (2, 1, 4, 3) wdom {1,2} (1, 2, 4, 3) . Of course, any individually rational and efficient rule must choose this allocation (which is also the unique γ-core allocation).
and set φ(R) = ϕ(l(R)) for all R ∈ R| A(ϕ) . Now for N , w, A(ϕ) and R| A(ϕ) the rule φ satisfies individual rationality, efficiency (because constrained efficiency of ϕ is equivalent to efficiency on A(ϕ)), and strategy-proofness. Thus, Theorem 2 applies and 1. and 2. hold for φ. Note that this is true for any φ constructed in this way,
i.e. for any R ∈ R we may choose the functions l i such that l i (R i | A(ϕ) ) = R i (and
Corollary 2 allows us in addition to construct largest sets of feasible allocations such that there may exist a rule satisfying individual rationality, efficiency, and strategy-proofness: in situations where for A f there does not exist any such rule, at the extreme by setting A = {w} there trivially exists a rule satisfying our properties. Now a set w ∈ A ⊆ A f is a largest set of allocations (for our properties) if there exists a rule ϕ : R → A (with (A\{w}) ⊆ A(ϕ)) satisfying individual rationality, constrained efficiency, and strategy-proofness, and for any set A A there does not exist a rule ϕ : R → A (with (A \{w}) ⊆ A(ϕ)). Now of course, any such largest set A must be such that for any R ∈ R, C γ (R| A ) is either essentially single-valued or empty. Hence, we may look for largest sets of allocations w ∈ A ⊆ A f such that for all R ∈ R, C γ (R| A ) is either essentially single-valued or empty (and for any set A A there exists R ∈ R such that C γ (R| A ) is multi-valued). Note that this construction applies to environments with and without externalities.
In the context of coalition formation, Pápai (2004) characterizes the coalition formation models which have a singleton core for any preference profile. Equivalently she identifies largest sets of coalitions which can be formed such that the core is a singleton. Pápai (2007) answers a similar question in exchange markets with multiple individual endowments.
Remark 2 Sönmez (1999) has shown that special cases of his model are (hedonic) coalition formation and (hedonic) network formation. For both these models, we have for all i ∈ N , w(i) = {w ij : j ∈ N \{i}} where w ij is the permit for agent j to join a coalition with agent i (or w ij is the permit for agent j to form a link with agent i). In the coalition formation model a feasible allocation is a partition of the set of agents,
i.e.
A f c = {a ∈ A : for all distinct i, j ∈ N, w ij ∈ a(j) ⇔ w ji ∈ a(i), and for all distinct i, j, k ∈ N, w ij ∈ a(j) & w jk ∈ a(k) ⇒ w ik ∈ a(k)}.
In the network formation model a feasible allocation is a network consisted of a set of pairwise (undirected) links, i.e.
For the coalition formation model, one may consider for any agent all strict rankings over all coalitions to which he belongs to (and preferences over partitions are selfish). For the network formation model, one may consider for any agent all strict rankings over all components (which is a set of links) to which he belongs to (and preferences over networks are selfish). In both of these cases on the full domain there does not exist an allocation rule satisfying individual rationality, efficiency, and strategy-proofness. This is not entirely surprising because both coalition formation and network formation are generalizations of two-sided marriage markets, and if there would be a rule satisfying individual rationality, efficiency, and strategy-proofness in these models, then there would exist one satisfying these properties in marriage markets 8 (but the γ-core may be multi-valued in marriage markets). However, in applications we may use Corollary 2 to restrict preference domains and/or the set of feasible coalitions/links (or equivalently weaken efficiency to constrained efficiency in order to obtain a positive result (and this approach allows for externalities)).
Housing Markets with Indifferences
Using our main result it follows that on the domain where indifferences with the endowment are excluded, all the rules of Alcalde-Unzu and Molis (2011) and Jaramillo 8 Simply take the restriction of this rule to all marriage problems.
and Manjunath (2012) are core selections (when the core is non-empty) and that the core is essentially single-valued when non-empty (Wako, 1991; Ma, 1994) . (2011) and Jaramillo and Manjunath (2012) construct "large" families of rules satisfying individual rationality, efficiency and strategy-proofness on the domain R withÃ being the set of feasible allocations. Therefore, the domain R is solvable while for some preference profiles the γ-core is empty and those rules may choose non-equivalent (in terms of welfare) allocations. Now Theorem 2 generalizes these results from the core to the γ-core and both for any domain in between the strict and the weak one, and for any subset ofÃ being the set of feasible allocations.
and w ∈ A f ⊆Ã. Then the following holds:
(i) For any allocation rule ϕ : D → A f satisfying individual rationality, efficiency
and strategy-proofness, we have for all R ∈ D such that C γ (R) = ∅, ϕ(R) ∈ C γ (R).
(ii) For all R ∈ D and all a, b ∈ C γ (R), we have aI i b for all i ∈ N .
One extreme case of Corollary 3 is the strict domain whereÃ is the set of feasible allocations, and Corollary 3 together with Proposition 2 corresponds to Ma (1994) Often in one-sided assignment problems we face logistical constraints, as for example in kidney exchange (Roth, Sönmez andÜnver, 2004 ) only a certain number of kidneys can be transplanted, or geographical moving constraints whereby agents can only move to houses which are not "too far away". Given 1 ≤ k ≤ |N |, let
where at most k agents move. Obviously, A k is not separable and the core is a subsolution of the γ-core. In addition, in kidney exchange externalities prevail because often "shorter" chains or cycles are preferred to "longer" ones. Another source for externalities in housing markets may be the fact that an agent does not care only about which good he consumes but also about the identity of the agent who consumes his/her endowment. In other words agent i's preference relation on
Below we show that Assumption B is necessary for deriving the conclusion of Theorem 2. We know from Ma (1994) that on the strict domain for any profile there exists a unique core allocation which can be derived via the top trading cycles algorithm (TTC), and TTC is the unique allocation rule satisfying individual rationality, efficiency and strategy-proofness. 9 We describe a subdomain of the "strict" house exchange domain where for any profile there exists a unique core allocation (and the core is externally stable) but there are allocation rules which are individually rational, efficient and strategy-proof and do not always choose core allocations. and single-peakedness imply 1P 3 2P 3 3. Obviously × i∈NPi =P ⊆ P = × i∈N P i . We define ϕ as follows: for any R ∈P, (i) if top(R 1 ) = 3, top(R 3 ) = 1, top(R 2 ) = 1, then ϕ(R) = (3, 1, 2); (ii) if top(R 1 ) = 3, top(R 3 ) = 1, top(R 2 ) = 3, then ϕ(R) = (2, 3, 1);
and (iii) otherwise ϕ(R) = C(R). By single-peakedness, for profiles of type (i) and (ii) we must have 3P 1 2P 1 1 and 1P 3 2P 3 3. Now it is straightforward that ϕ is individually rational and efficient. In showing strategy-proofness 11 it suffices to consider profiles R of type (i) or (ii), say R is a profile of type (i). Obviously agents 1 and 2 cannot manipulate. If agent 3 reports some other R 3 ∈P 3 , then by single-peakedness, top(R 3 ) = 1. If top(R 3 ) = 2, then ϕ(R 1 , R 2 , R 3 ) = ϕ(R), and if top(R 3 ) = 3, then by individual rationality, ϕ(R 1 , R 2 , R 3 ) = 3. In both cases agent 3 does not profitably manipulate.
